


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K-211-211
Vol. 1
V. 2

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

314TH AIR DIVISION

HISTORY

CLASSIFIED BY _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
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31 DECEMBER 1962

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8 DEC 1962

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314AD/KBC Newsletter

Lieutenant General Jacob E. Smart
Commander
Fifth Air Force
APO 925


Dear General Smart

This is my 314AD/KBC Newsletter for December 1962 plus those November items not covered in my letter of 16 November 1962. (U)

COMBAT OPERATIONS

1. On 3 December 1962, CINCUNC and interested members of his staff were given a joint 314AD/EUSA briefing on a close air support FTX concept and planning progress to date. General Meloy indicated approval of the concept and approved the objective of conducting the initial exercise in January 1963. Since I am planning to brief you and your staff on this, at Fuchu, on 13 December 1963 and since you are already quite familiar with the plan, I won't go into it any further in this letter other than to note that USAF airplane time, forward air controllers and training ammunition support appear to be the major Fifth AF problem areas. (S)
2. On 19 November 1963 we started using the 39th AD and 8th TFW flyable alert aircraft for simulated close air support missions, and on 3 December 1963 the 3rd Bomb Wing B-57s. In the latter instance, it was necessary to obtain a PACAF waiver of recall provisions since it lengthens their turnaround time by approximately ten minutes. The waiver applies only during DEFCONs 3, 4 and 5. We have been negotiating with the Seventh Fleet to fly simulated close air support on a regular basis also. As a result, we are having an exercise incorporating the US Navy during the period 17 - 20 December 1962. While they will operate primarily in a close air support role, on one of the days they will be used additionally as fakers in an air defense exercise. (S)


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3. The F-102 deployment from Yokota to Osan from 24 October 1962 to 14 November 1962, in response to CINCUNC's request during the recent DEFCON 3, worked out extremely well from our standpoint. They augmented our in-position ROKAF capability with their increased speed, altitude and fire power capability. Further, being here in a "hot-gun" role led to our refining and exercising many procedures involving communications, ordnance and other types of support. Initially two, and later four, of the six aircraft deployed were kept on flyable alert, hence enabling a limited amount of BONE DEEP type of support clying while they were in place. As a result of this deployment, the regular BONE DEEP deployment for November was cancelled. (S)

4. We are currently in the intelligence build-up phase of UNC CPX STRONG SHIELD. This phase commenced on 29 November 1962 and will continue until the combat phase commences on 9 December 1962. The exercise will terminate on 12 December 1962. STRONG SHIELD has the same objectives as did last year's CPX TURN BACK; namely, to test the readiness of UNC forces to defend the Republic of Korea should hostilities resume. The value of these theater CPXs to AFK/314AD has increased progressively with each one conducted and I feel that STRONG SHIELD will continue this trend. We have been working closely with the UNC exercise staff for the past several months and anticipate a very strong air defense and tactical air play in this exercise. Our staff and command agencies are already off and running in preparation for commencement of hostilities and I look for them all to perform well. (S)

5. In previous letters and conversations, I have mentioned the organizational steps I am taking with respect to my Director of Air Defense structure. Although far from fully organized, this shop is gaining great momentum and the results of its work are being evidenced across the board in terms of increased performance. In broad terms, the major organizational problem is one of shifting the primary emphasis of certain AC&W personnel from the advisory role to that of exercising USAF combat operational control. I emphasize the word "primary" since, as advisory personnel, they have been used also in the operational control role. At such time as their primary role is changed, they will continue to operate in an advisory capacity as a secondary duty. This step could not be taken until the ROKAF had progressed to a point of considerable self-sufficiency. That point has been reached



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now and it is timely to remove the personnel in question from the advisory function and transfer them to the combat operations side of the 314AD. This step, incidentally, is completely in line with the MAP objective of progressive phase-down as country forces mature. Fifth Air Force staff agencies concerned have been working closely with my staff on this and, with the exception referred to in paragraph 1, SUPPORT OPERATIONS, below, the matter is progressing nicely. (S)

SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. The problem referred to above is in the manpower area and has to do specifically with the processing of manpower space authorizations. The difficulty appears to be a breakdown in the machines, at PACAF, on which manpower documents are processed. In any event, PACAF has been able to process only a few manpower change requests since last June and indications are that the present restriction will continue until April 1963. This means that manpower changes (AFSCs, shifts between unit manning documents, mission dictated increases and decreases, corrections, etc) which have become essential since last June will not be responded to by the Personnel system before September 1963 for airmen and as late as December 1963 for officers. In addition to required changes in the Air Defense Directorate, as discussed above, my Civil Engineer and Materiel Directorates are similarly impeded as are the Advisory Group and the 6175th Air Base Group. The Air Force continues to strive for improved management and, invariably, such improvements in some way affect manpower. A forward moving operating unit is in dire straits when the ability to effect manpower changes is frozen. (C)


2. We had what I hope will prove to be a very productive meeting at Kunsan on 4 December 1962. The subject was relocation of the 39AD QUICK STRIKE force from Osan to Kunsan. In addition to Hq 5AF and 114AD, the 39 AD and 5BW were represented. General Beverly and I both attended. The following listing reflects the major items involved and forecast "get well" dates. On the basis of this information, it was concluded that the 39th should not plan to move back to Kunsan prior to March 1963. (S/NF)

a. Completion of Construction:

- | | |
|--------------------|-----------------|
| (1) Green Building | 30 January 1963 |
| (2) Christmas Tree | 15 January 1963 |

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| b. Redesign and Modification of Aircraft Shelter Door Brackets | 15 February 1963 |
| c. Installation of Communications | 10 January 1963 |
| d. Completion of New Power Substation | 31 January 1963 |
| e. Arrival of Remaining Required Back-up Generators | 20 February 1963 |


3. I have had an interchange of messages with your headquarters on a matter of considerable import, which I am not sure has come fully to your attention -- namely, the installation of BAK-9 arrestors at Osan and Kunsan. (S/NF)

a. The present schedule calls for their installation at Osan commencing 1 January 1963 and, following completion at Osan, to commence installation at Kunsan (on or about 1 April 1963).

b. The project is much more complex at Osan since the runway must be cut 1500 feet from each end in order to install the underground lateral channels required. A cut of 1500 feet from either end coupled with construction equipment on the runway will decrease the effective runway length and increase accident potential to the point where operation of the 8th TFW and 39th AD flyable alert aircraft becomes most questionable. Further, January is perhaps the worst possible time to do such extensive concrete work.

c. On the other hand, the project at Kunsan is relatively simple. The underground laterals were installed during the runway rehabilitation period; hence, the BAK-9 arrestors can be installed with very little interference to normal aircraft operation.

d. In view of the above considerations, it seems to us here that the Kunsan installation should be accomplished first. When Kunsan is completed and following the relocation of the 39th, the Osan installation should be initiated. Possibly the 8TFW flyables could be placed at Kunsan while the work is being accomplished at Osan. Were this latter schedule to be followed, not only would we avoid interference with so much QUICK STRIKE capability but, further, it would put us in a much better weather period for the extensive concrete work required at Osan.



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3 December 1962, which did not give us time for any program coordination with higher headquarters. I did not consider this too serious, however, since the GEEIA meeting is more of a preliminary look at the programs to give GEEIA as much insight as possible on what lies ahead. Hence, we are not committed to anything being discussed there. On the other hand, however, I don't feel there can be any significant disagreement with the plan we developed. Colonel Gravette, 314AD Director of Air Defense, headed my group and is accompanied by Lt Col Reger, Director of Communications, 6146 AFAG, and Lt Col Corcoran, Director of Civil Engineering, 6146 AFAG. This party will brief Hq PACAF and Hq 5AF enroute back to Korea during mid-December. (S/NF)


OTHER

1. On 23 November 1962, Ambassador Berger paid us a visit and received a briefing on AFK/314AD/KBC activities in Korea. This was a continuation of a visit by Mrs Berger and him on 22 October 1962 which was cut short by the Cuban crisis. On the 22 October visit, he received a tour of the base and we had a reception and dinner for them that evening. Following our briefing on 23 November, he gave a few of us a most interesting one-hour briefing on the Korean scene as he sees it. Needless to say, I was delighted with the rapport which I feel these two visits generated. (C)

2. You may recall my mentioning, some time ago, our great need here for an adequate field uniform. We are continually involved in joint field exercises and appearing in everything from the Class A uniform to Army fatigues. The Army, with their standardized field uniform, makes us look pretty bad. The best answer on this matter that I've been able to get from Washington is that USAF personnel are authorized to wear the Army field uniform. This, of course, defeats one of the objectives of the uniform -- namely, a distinctive appearance. In any event, effective with the current CPX STRONG SHIELD, I am authorizing 314AD personnel to wear the winter blue shirt (open at neck) with a light blue neck scarf and trousers (winter) bloused at the top of combat boots. For an outer garment, we are wearing a flight cap and an OD issue field jacket. It is a pretty fair looking uniform, but, more important, we should all appear to be in the same organization. I am sure there is some regulation that would frown on this; however, I plan to forward some pictures and restate the requirement again in the hopes that the Air Force, despite DOD's single management concept on uniforms, will reconsider our need for our own distinctive field

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uniform. As the USAF moves towards increased emphasis on tactical aviation and joint operations, this matter becomes of increasing import. (U)


3. Since this is my last newsletter for calendar year 1962, I will take this opportunity to wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy 1963. (U)

4. This letter is classified SECRET/NOFORN because it contains operational status data.

Sincerely

J. M. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
FY 63 MAP (S/NF)


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